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THE SURPRISING ACQUITTALS IN THE GOTOVINA
AND PERIŠIĆ CASES: IS THE ICTY APPEALS
CHAMBER A TRIAL CHAMBER
IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING?
Mark A. Summers*
INTRODUCTION
Over a decade ago, not long after the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)1
had begun its work, one commentator opined that because of the three
trial judge/five appellate judge structure of the tribunal, a three-judge
majority of an Appeals Chamber could overturn a unanimous judgment by a Trial Chamber. Thus, there is “a risk . . . that three voices
may prevail over five, where all the judges who have actually viewed
the evidence are on the defeated side.”2
That happened in November 2012, when a three-judge majority ICTY Appeals Chamber overturned a unanimous Trial Chamber
judgment.3 The lead defendant in the case was Ante Gotovina, a Croatian General and war hero, who led Operation Storm, which finally
drove the Serbians out of Croatia after three years of occupation.4 This
was the beginning of the end of the Yugoslav war.5 In Croatia,
Gotovina’s conviction by the Trial Chamber in 2011 was met with
scorn and cynicism. The wags commented that Gotovina, the Croatian
word for “cash,” was the price of Croatia’s admission to the European
Union.6
* Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, B.A.,
Washington and Jefferson College; J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M (International Law), Cambridge University. I would like to thank the Barry University
School of Law for its support in the writing of this article.
1
U.N. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
2
Mark C. Fleming, Appellate Review in the International Criminal Tribunals, 37
TEX. INT’L L.J. 111, 115 (2002).
3
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012). Trial Chamber Judge Íinis partially dissented from some of the majority’s findings but not from its judgment.
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011).
4
See infra Part IV.
5
See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR 72–73 (1998).
6
As a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Zagreb in the spring of 2011, I have
first-hand knowledge of these events. See Nick Carey, Croatia Finds EU’s Entry
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Gotovina’s surprise acquittal by the Appeals Chamber was celebrated in Croatia and decried in Serbia.7 It was praised by some commentators and panned by others.8 It is no surprise that some were
shocked when, only three months later, another ICTY Appeals Chamber overturned the conviction of Momčilo Perišić, who had been the top
general in the Serbian army during the war.9
One crucial similarity between the two cases is the focus of this
article. In each case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had insufficiently explained why it had come to a factual conclusion.10 This failure to provide a reasoned opinion was an error of law,
which, both Appeals Chambers asserted, gave them the right to undertake a de novo review of the record without giving any deference to the
findings of the Trial Chamber.11 This maneuver permitted the Appeals
Chambers to substitute their findings for those of the Trial Chambers
without applying the standard of review normally applicable to errors
of fact. A Trial Chamber’s judgment is overturned only if no reasonable
trier of fact could have come to same conclusion.12 The Appeals Chambers’ novel use of de novo review in cases where the error is the failure
to provide a reasoned opinion based on a Trial Chamber’s factual mistake is unsupported by the case law of either the ICTY or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”),13 and could have

Price Steep, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1110
15177847171707.
7
Jens David Ohlin, Why the Gotovina Appeals Judgment Matters, EJIL: TALK!
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/why-the-gotovina-appeals-judgment-mat
ters/.
8
Compare Gary D. Solis, The Gotovina Acquittal: A Sound Appellate Course Correction, 215 MIL. L. REV. 78 (2013), with Marko Milanovic, The Gotovina
Omnishambles, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-gotovinaomnishambles/.
9
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). Perišić’s acquittal was celebrated in Serbia.
Christopher Jenks, Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, 107 Am. J. Int’l L.
622, 626 (2013). It was a bit less controversial, however, because the Perišić Trial
Chamber had split 2-1 and the Appeals Chamber reversed 4-1, the majority including one of the dissenting judges in Gotovina. Marko Milanovic, The Limits of
Aiding and Abetting Liability: The ICTY Appeals Chamber Acquits Mom-Čilo Perišić, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-limits-of-aiding-andabetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-chamber-acquits-momcilo-perisic/#more-7749.
10
See infra Part VI.
11
See id.
12
Milanovic, supra note 8.
13
U.N. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/955 (1994).
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future negative repercussions if the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) follows these cases.14
This article argues that the decisions in Gotovina and Perišić
are wrong because de novo review is not the appropriate standard to
apply when there is a failure to provide a reasoned opinion. First, Part
II examines the origins of reasoned opinions in international criminal
trials. Part III explains why reasoned opinions are necessary in international criminal trials. Part IV will identify the necessary elements of
a reasoned opinion. Part V analyzes the ICTY and ICTR case law to
ascertain the standards of review used in international criminal trials.
Part VI dissects the portions of the Gotovina and Perišić Appeals Judgments dealing with the failure to provide reasoned opinions and the
use of de novo review. Finally, Part VII offers my conclusions.
I. THE ORIGINS OF REASONED OPINIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIALS: THE ADVERSARIAL AND INQUISITORIAL MODELS
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Most of the world’s national criminal justice systems can be
classified as either adversarial or inquisitorial. And while none of
these national systems are entirely “pure,” there are certain salient
features that characterize each of the models.15
A. The Adversarial Model
The adversarial systems are predicated upon opposing parties,
equally armed, who are responsible for investigating the case and
presenting it in court.16 The jury is composed of laypersons.17 The parties elicit facts in open court from witnesses who testify under oath
and from documents and other physical evidence.18 The jury and, most
of the time, the judge learn what they know about the case only when
the evidence is presented in court.19 The judge plays the role of a “neutral” referee, administering complex rules of evidence, which determine what the jury may hear, instructing the jury as to the law
applicable to the facts, and imposing the sentence following a guilty
verdict.20 The accused may or may not testify.21 If he chooses to tes14

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
83.
15
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 366 (2008). See Sean Doran et
al., Rethinking Aversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,
13–14, 16 (1995).
16
CASSESE, supra note 15, at 356.
17
Id. at 357.
18
Doran et al., supra note 15, at 17–18.
19
CASSESE, supra note 15, at 361–62.
20
Id. at 361, 363. See Doran et al., supra note 15, at 15–16.
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tify, he is put under oath and treated as any other witness.22 If he
chooses not to testify, the jury is instructed that it may not draw any
adverse inferences from his failure to do so.23 The verdict is tersely
“enigmatic”—guilty or not guilty—unaccompanied by any statement of
the reasons for or against.24 Only the defendant may appeal a guilty
verdict and an appellate court must assume that, in order for it to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury found the facts most
favorable to the prosecution’s case.25 Appellate courts almost never
hear additional evidence, and appellate review is ordinarily limited to
correcting mistakes of law, except in those rare instances when no reasonable jury could have reached the same conclusion as the trial
jury.26
B. The Inquisitorial Model
In the inquisitorial systems, there is an investigating judge
who is responsible for gathering the evidence. The judge investigates
both sides of the case and can terminate weak cases prior to trial.27 If
the investigating judge determines that there is sufficient evidence of
guilt, she sends the factual record (dossier de la cause) to the trial
court.28 The dossier itself is the evidence and the oral testimony in
court is often merely an affirmation of the accuracy of the information
contained in the dossier.29 In some countries, the jury panel is a mixture of laypersons and professional judges.30 The presiding judge is the
dominant figure in the trial, aggressively questioning the witnesses
who testify, including the defendant, who is not under oath.31 Because
the judges are professionals, there are few rules of evidence.32 Consequently, the panel normally considers all the evidence (liberté des
preuves)33 and specifies that on which it relied in a written judgment,
which is called a “reasoned opinion.”34 The reasoned opinion explains
why the court reached its conclusions both as to the facts and as to the
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

CASSESE, supra note 15, at 360.
Id.
LAFAVE ET AL., Criminal Procedure § 24.5(b) (4th ed. 2004).
Doran et al., supra note 15, at 18, 21.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 23, §27.5(d).
See infra note 88 discussing Jackson v. Virginia.
CASSESE, supra note 15, at 356.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 361–62.
Doran et al., supra note 15, at 19–20.
CASSESE, supra note 15, at 363.
Id. at 358.
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law.35 Appeals are trials de novo, with the appellate court conducting a
thorough review of the record, substituting its judgment for that of the
trial court, both as to the law and as to the facts.36
C. International Criminal Trials: A Blended Procedure
When the first international criminal tribunal was established
following Germany’s defeat in World War II, the victorious allies represented both criminal procedure models. The United States and the
United Kingdom followed the adversarial model while the French epitomized the inquisitorial model; this is because one of its most important features, the investigating judge, was instituted in the 1808
Napoleonic Code.37 The Soviet Union, supported by France, wanted
speedy trials followed by speedier executions, which would have had
none of the features of a fair trial and would have provided no protection for the rights of the accused.38
In the end, the adversarial system of oral evidence presented in
open court by the parties largely prevailed.39 The fact-finder, however,
was a panel of professional judges whose judgment was rendered in a
reasoned opinion.40 The International Criminal Court has adopted, as
have all the post-war ad hoc international criminal tribunals, that basic model.41 Consequently, the courtroom part of an international
criminal trial would be familiar to any common law lawyer. Live witnesses, whom the parties call, are placed under oath and are subjected
to both direct and cross-examination. Likewise, the parties present the
documentary and physical evidence, which become part of the trial record when admitted by the court.
On the other hand, the decision-making process would not be
so familiar. Once all the evidence is presented, the trial court retires to
consider its verdict. Unlike a lay jury, which usually announces its
verdict after hours or, at most, days of deliberation, the international
jury renders its verdict months later in the form of a written opinion,
35

CRYE, et al., AN INTRODUCTION

DURE 387 (2008).
36
CASSESE, supra

TO

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

AND

PROCE-

note 15, at 364. Some countries limit the right of appeal to questions of law when the lower court decisions are reached by panels of professional
judges because the “risk of erroneous conviction is lower.” Fleming, supra note 2,
at 114.
37
CASSESE, supra note 15, at 357.
38
See WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN
WAR CRIMINALS AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II AT NUREMBURG, GERMANY, 19451946, at 16–17 (Southern Methodist Press ed., 1999).
39
Id. at 11.
40
Charter of the International Military Tribunal arts. 2, 26, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 280.
41
CASSESE, supra note 15, at 369–70.
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which is often hundreds, if not more than a thousand, pages long.42
This reasoned opinion resolves issues of fact and law and imposes a
sentence.43
The requirement for a reasoned judgment was included in the
statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, although
there was no necessity for a written judgment because there was no
appeal.44 The Tribunal’s judgment was more than 150 pages long and,
while it did resolve the difficult legal questions the Tribunal faced, the
bulk of it was devoted to the Tribunal’s findings of fact and the bases
upon which it had concluded that the defendants were either guilty or
innocent.45
The statutes of the post-war ad hoc international criminal
tribunals and the ICC all contain provisions requiring a verdict in the
form of a “reasoned opinion,”46 and they all provide for appellate review.47 A reasoned opinion is considered an essential element of a fair
trial.48

42

For example, in the Gotovina case, final arguments concluded on September 1,
2010, and the Trial Chamber Judgment was issued April 15, 2011. Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, & Mladen Markač,
INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, available at http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/gotovina/cis/en/cis_gotovina_al_en.pdf [hereinafter Gotovina Information
Sheet]. The Trial Chamber’s Judgment in Gotovina was nearly 1400 pages. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011).
43
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T,
Judgment.
44
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 40, art. 26. The
Charter does not mandate that the judgment be in writing, although, practically
speaking, there was no other way to announce the verdict of the court and give the
reasons for it. The lack of an appeal was one of the criticisms of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. See Fleming, supra note 2, at 111.
45
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment (October 1, 1946),
available at http://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judge
ment.pdf.
46
U.N. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, art. 23(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]; U.N. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C.
Res. 955, art. 22(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 74(5), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
47
ICTY Statute, supra note 46, art. 25; ICTR Statute, supra note 46, art. 24; ICC
Statute, supra note 46, art. 81.
48
See, e.g., Torija v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 18-19 (1994).
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INTERNATIONAL

It is a fair question why a reasoned opinion is required when
judges are fact-finders, but not when laypersons are the fact-finders.
Intuitively, it would seem that it should be the other way around. But,
as one appeals chamber of the ICTR observed:
When considering this case in the context of the Tribunal, it has to be borne in mind that here the trier of fact
is not a jury, but a panel of professional judges. In the
case of the jury, the one question that has to be answered
is the question of guilty or not guilty, and the factual
findings supporting this conclusion are neither spelled
out nor can they be challenged by one of the parties. The
instruction given to the jury concentrates on this ‘ultimate issue’ of the case. In this Tribunal, on the other
hand, Trial Chambers cannot restrict themselves to the
ultimate issue of guilty or not guilty; they have an obligation pursuant to Article 22(2) of the Statute, translated into Rule 88 (C) of the Rules, to give a reasoned
opinion.49
Aside from this legal obligation to render a reasoned opinion, there are
a number of cogent reasons supporting the reasoned opinion
requirement.
First, since appellate courts in the inquisitorial model have
greater latitude to overturn the factual findings of a trial court, a reasoned judgment is necessary so that the defendant can exercise his
right to appeal.50 This is so because, unlike in the adversarial model
where the jury may only consider the evidence the judge admits, in the
inquisitorial model all or almost all of the evidence in the dossier is
considered.51 Without a reasoned opinion, it would be impossible for
an appellate court to tell what influenced the verdict and what did
not.52
49

Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment, ¶ 169 (Int’l. Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda July 7, 2006).
50
Nchamihigo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A, Judgment, ¶ 165 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 18, 2010).
51
Bernard H. Oxman, International Criminal Procedure – Scope of ICTY Appellate Review – Eyewitness Credibility – Reasoned Opinion by Trial Judges – Adequacy of Factual Allegations in Indictment, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 439, 444 (2002)
(observing that “international criminal tribunals employ a hybrid procedure: they
allow cross-examination, as at common law, yet also admit evidence more freely,
as at civil law”).
52
Cf. id. at 444 (“[The] reasoned opinion . . . invites more rigorous appellate review.”); see also Doran et al., supra note 15, at 49.
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Second, scholars have studied the “Diplock” courts, which were
instituted in Northern Ireland to deal with terrorist cases.53 These
courts follow common law procedures, except that the judge is both the
fact-finder and the decision-maker.54 In the cases that were studied,
the researchers found that the Diplock judges tended to be more interventionist than their counterparts who presided over jury trials.55
Unlike lay jurors, who are “passive” fact-finders, judges charged with
making the ultimate determination in a case “often react to their duty
by trying to bring the hearing into some order and coherence by following their own partial lines of inquiry, which may prevent the parties
from having a sufficient opportunity to present their cases.”56 To safeguard against this “adversarial deficit,” Diplock judges are required to
issue reasoned opinions.57
Finally, international criminal trials are extremely complex
with the evidentiary phase of the trial lasting months and sometimes
years.58 In many of them, hundreds of witnesses testify, and
thousands of exhibits are admitted into evidence.59 The reasoned opinions are hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of pages long.60 In such
circumstances, appellate review of the trial record without a reasoned
opinion would be a daunting task to say the least.
III.

THE ELEMENTS

OF A

REASONED OPINION

There is extensive case law in both the ICTY and the ICTR
regarding the essential elements that a reasoned opinion must contain.61 Trial chambers are required to make findings of fact for each
essential element of a charged crime.62 But they are not required to
53

Doran et al., supra note 15, at 11–13.
Id. at 12.
55
See id. at 28–29.
56
Id.
57
Oxman, supra note 51, at 444.
58
For example, in the Gotovina trial, there were 303 trial days spanning the period from March 11, 2008 until September 1, 2010. Gotovina Information Sheet,
supra note 42.
59
See id.
60
The Gotovina trial chamber judgment was nearly 1400 pages in length. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
61
The ICTY and the ICTR share an appeals chamber and the chambers frequently cite each other’s opinions. See Gabrielle McIntyre, The International
Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals of the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3 GO. J. INT’L L. 3, 923, 928–29 n.8 (2011).
62
Renzaho v. Prosecutor, Case No. ITCR-97-31-A, Judgment, ¶ 320 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Apr. 1, 2011). But, even where no explicit factual findings are
made, an appeals chamber may infer that “by finding that the crimes were established, the Trial Chamber implicitly found all the relevant factual findings re54
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refer to every “witness testimony or every piece of evidence,” and “although certain evidence may not have been referred to . . . it may be
reasonable to assume that the Trial Chamber took it into account.”63
A trial chamber may not, however, disregard a piece of evidence that is
“clearly relevant” to findings made by the trial chamber.64 The failure
to provide a reasoned opinion that meets this standard is treated as an
error of law, even when that failure relates to a finding of fact.65
Although there is a presumption that a trial chamber has
“evaluated all the evidence presented to it,”66 there are situations
where an appeals chamber holds the trial chamber to a higher standard to provide a reasoned opinion.67 One such circumstance is where
the guilty verdict depends upon “identification evidence given by a witness under difficult circumstances.”68 In that case, “the Trial Chamber
must rigorously implement its duty to provide a ‘reasoned opinion.’”69
Another situation where a trial chamber is required to make
reasoned findings is when the evidence relating to one of the essential
elements of the crime is circumstantial. In that instance the trial

quired to cover the elements of the crimes.” Prosecutor v. Kordič & Čerkez, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 384 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Dec. 17, 2004).
63
Nchamihigo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A, Judgment, ¶ 166 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 18, 2010).
64
Id.; Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-73-A, Judgment, ¶ 45 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 16, 2009).
65
Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-73-A, Judgment, ¶ 46 (holding
inter alia that the Trial Chamber’s failure to address the feasibility of defendant’s
traveling between two locations in the amount of time alleged by the prosecution
was an error of law); see also Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A,
Judgment, ¶¶ 144, 147–48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Aug. 29, 2008) (finding
that the Trial Chamber’s failure to address inconsistencies in witness testimony
was an error of law).
66
Prosecutor v. Kvočka, et. al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005).
67
Id. ¶ 24.
68
Prosecutor v. Kupreškič, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001). In assessing identification testimony,
“‘little or no credence’ is given to the witness’s in-court identification.”
Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgment, ¶ 96 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 20, 2010) (quoting Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR-95-54A-A, Judgment, ¶ 243 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 19, 2005)).
69
Prosecutor v. Kupreškič, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 39; see also Oxman,
supra note 51, at 444 (opining that under the “difficult-circumstances doctrine” the
trial chamber has an “enhanced duty” to “articulate adequate reasoning”).
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chamber must explain how the findings it made were the “only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence.”70
A third instance when findings must be explicit is when there
is conflicting testimony about a fact that is relevant to a finding of
guilt. Then, the trial chamber must “provide sufficient reasons” for
crediting the testimony of the witnesses it relied upon over that of the
conflicting witnesses.71 Otherwise, the appeals chamber cannot
“determin[e] whether the Trial Chamber assessed the entire evidence
on this point exhaustively and properly.”72
IV.

STANDARDS

OF

REVIEW

Because additional evidence may be admitted on appeal73 and
the prosecutor may appeal from a judgment of acquittal,74 there are
additional standards of review in the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals to deal with situations not confronted by common law courts.
Because this article deals with appellate acquittals in cases where no
additional evidence was admitted on appeal, it will limit itself to the
standards of review applicable to errors of law, errors of fact, mixed
errors of law and fact, and instances where the trial chamber has
made no findings.
The ICTY and ICTR statutes contain identical provisions regarding appellate review of a trial chamber’s judgment.75 Both provide
that the appeals chamber can reverse the trial chamber when there is
either a) “an error on a question of law invalidating the decision;” or b)
“an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”76
Neither statute elaborates upon either “invalidating the decision” or
“miscarriage of justice,” leaving these as matters for judicial interpre70

Renzaho v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-31-A, Judgment, ¶ 319 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Apr. 1, 2011).
71
Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgment, ¶ 147.
72
Id. ¶ 148.
73
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškič, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 24 (Int’l.
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) (defining additional standards of review in cases where there is an alleged error of fact and additional
evidence has been admitted on appeal and cases where there is an alleged error in
the legal standard plus an alleged error of fact and additional evidence has been
admitted on appeal).
74
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blagojevič & Jokič, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 9
(Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007) (setting the standard of
review for prosecution appeals).
75
U.N. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
art. 25. U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); U.N. Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 24, U.N. Doc. S/RES /955 (1994).
76
Id.
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tation. Similarly, the statutes do not define the applicable standards of
review.77
A. Errors of Law78
Where the appeals chamber identifies an error of law, for example if the trial chamber has applied an incorrect legal standard,
“the Appeals Chamber will articulate the correct legal standard and
review the relevant factual findings of the Trial Chamber accordingly.”79 In doing so, not only is the legal error corrected, but also the
appeals chamber satisfies itself whether, given the application of the
correct legal standard, it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt.80
Indeed, with regard to pure errors of law, it may be a misnomer
even to say that there is a standard of review because:
Errors of law do not raise a question as to the standard of
review as directly as errors of fact. Where a party contends that a Trial Chamber made an error, the Appeals
Chamber, as the final arbiter of the law of the Tribunal,
must determine whether there was such a mistake.81
Logically then, the presence or absence of a reasoned opinion is irrelevant when the question is whether there was a pure error of law be77

The tribunals’ rules of procedure and evidence are likewise silent on these questions. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, available at http://www.icty.org/x/
file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev49_en.pdf. ICTR Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/
Legal/Evidance/English/130410amended%206_26.pdf.
78
Fleming, supra note 2, at 124:
A question of law, on the other hand, is a determination of the
legal effect of the facts as found. The determination of a question
of law involves two steps that are not distinguished in Article 25
[of the ICTY Statute], but are often identified in domestic
jurisprudence. The first, which could be called a question of ‘pure
law,’ is one where the court determines an abstract principle of
general application that is independent of the facts of the case
under consideration.
79
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševič, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 14 (Int’l.
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009). See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) (holding that the trial chamber’s ruling that “specific direction is
not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting was an error of law”).
80
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševič, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 14.
These basic principles are repeated in every ICTY and ICTR appeals judgment in
a section of the opinion entitled, “Standard of Review.”
81
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 35 (Int’l. Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
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cause the appeals chamber will identify and correct the error no
matter how much reasoning was supplied by the trial chamber making
it.82 For example, in Perišić, the Appeals Chamber corrected the Trial
Chamber’s definition of the legal standard for aiding and abetting. In
so doing, it stated:
The Appeals Chamber emphasises [sic] that the Trial
Chamber’s legal error was understandable given the particular phrasing of the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal
Judgement. However, the Appeals Chamber’s duty to
correct legal errors remains unchanged. Accordingly, the
Appeals Chamber will proceed to assess the evidence relating to Perišić’s convictions for aiding and abetting de
novo under the correct legal standard.83
B. Errors of Fact84
Errors of fact are less straightforward. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber addressed this issue in its very first case when it stated that
the standard of review for an error of fact is “unreasonableness, that is
a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached.”85 Since
that decision, appeals chambers of both the ICTY and ICTR have consistently echoed this same standard.86 In applying this standard, appeals chambers have stressed that “two judges, both acting
reasonably, can come to different conclusions on the basis of the same
evidence.”87
82

See Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 25–44.
Id. ¶ 43.
84
There is no reason for appellate courts to review questions of fact to achieve
their purposes of assuring the “consistency of verdicts and the orderly
development of law” because “[t]he decision that a certain body of evidence
warrants or does not warrant a certain factual finding beyond a reasonable doubt
cannot be of relevance to any other case.” Fleming, supra note 2, at 135. Instead,
appellate review of factual issues serves another purpose—“justice in the
individual case.” Id. at 136.
85
Prosecutor v. Tadič, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 64 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). See Fleming, supra note 2 at 138 (noting
that the Appeals Chamber in Tadič adopted the “common law standard”).
86
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶
34 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012); Kalimanzira v.
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Oct. 20, 2010). An alternative formulation of the standard of review is that the
trial chamber’s finding must be “wholly erroneous.” Prosecutor v. Galič, Case No.
IT-98-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30,
2006) (quoting Prosecutor v. Kupreškič, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 30 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001)).
87
Prosecutor v. Kupreškič, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 30.
83
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ICTY and ICTR appeals chambers apply a rule of deference to
the factual findings of the trial chambers. Thus, an appeals chamber
“will not lightly disturb findings of fact by a Trial Chamber . . . [because] the Trial Chamber has the advantage of observing the witness
testimony first-hand, and is, therefore, better positioned than this
Chamber to assess the reliability and credibility of the evidence.”88
Moreover, the appeals chambers have repeatedly explained that, unlike in the inquisitorial systems,89 an appeal is not a trial de novo.90
Finally, where a trial chamber has not made a finding of fact, “the
party seeking to have the Appeals Chamber make that finding for itself must demonstrate that such a finding is the only reasonable conclusion available.”91
C. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR statute address mixed questions of law and fact—that is, where a court applies “an objective legal
88

Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 37 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000). This is almost identical to the
approach taken in U.S. courts:
Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.,
at 362, 92 S.Ct., at 1624–1625. This familiar standard gives full
play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
89
CASSESE, supra note 15, at 364.
90
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgment, ¶ 40 (“This Chamber does not
operate as a second Trial Chamber”); Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-9613-A, Judgment, ¶ 17 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 16, 2001) (“The Appeals
Chamber stresses, as it has done in the past, that an appeal is not an opportunity
for a party to have a de novo review of their case.”); Prosecutor v. Kordič & Čerkez,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 21 n.15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) (“Furthermore, it is settled jurisprudence of the International
Tribunal that it is the trier of fact who is best placed to assess the evidence in its
entirety as well as the demeanour of a witness. The Appeals Chamber would act
ultra vires when reviewing proprio motu the entire trial record.”). Accord Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševič, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 14 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009).
91
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by
Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 30, 2001).
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standard to the facts”92—and there is scant case law addressing the
issue. In Prosecutor v. Strugar, the defendant challenged the Trial
Chamber’s finding that he should be held liable for crimes committed
by those under his command because it had erroneously concluded
that the facts established a superior-subordinate relationship.93 Despite the defendant’s characterization of the issue as a question of law,
the Appeals Chamber thought it was “a mixed error of law and fact”
and, therefore, applied the deference standard applicable to errors of
fact—“whether the conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber was one
which no reasonable trier of fact could have reached.”94 Strugar appears to be the only case squarely addressing this issue,95 so it is fair
to say that the Tribunals’ jurisprudence is underdeveloped.96
Strugar also illustrates the point that a party’s characterization of the issue is not controlling.97 In Prosecutor v. Blagojevič and
92

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting). One
commentator has described this as “a question of ‘applied law,’ [which] is the concrete determination of the consequences of a specific set of facts under a specific
principle of pure law.” Fleming, supra note 2, at 124.
93
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgment, ¶ 246 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008).
94
Id. ¶ 252.
95
A search of the ICTR/ICTY Case Law Database using the search term “mixed
errors (law and fact)” disclosed only the Strugar case as dealing squarely with that
issue. As we shall see, however, the Perišić Appeals Chamber took the position
that whether a superior-subordinate relationship had been established was a
question of law because the Trial Chamber had failed to provide a reasoned opinion. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 95 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013).
96
This becomes apparent when one looks at the approach of the U.S. Supreme
Court described by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Ornelas:
Merely labeling the issues ‘mixed questions,’ however, does not
establish that they receive de novo review. While it is well settled
that appellate courts ‘accep[t] findings of fact that are not ‘clearly
erroneous’ but decid[e] questions of law de novo,’ there is no rigid
rule with respect to mixed questions. We have said that ‘deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when
it appears that the district court is ‘better positioned’ than the
appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing
appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal
doctrine.’
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. at 701 (citations omitted).
97
See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševič, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 18
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009) (citing Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 252, 269):
[W]here the Appeals Chamber finds that a ground of appeal,
presented as relating to an alleged error of law, formulates no
clear legal challenge but essentially challenges the Trial Cham-
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Jokič, Jokič, who did not contest the legal standard utilized by the
Trial Chamber, argued that the Chamber’s conclusion that he had the
mens rea required for aiding and abetting was a legal error because
the facts were not sufficient to prove his knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.98 Rejecting Jokič’s argument, the Appeals Chamber stated:
[A]lthough a Trial Chamber’s factual findings are governed by the legal rule that facts essential to establishing the guilt of an accused have to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, this does not affect their nature as factual conclusions. A party arguing that a Trial Chamber
based its factual conclusions on insufficient evidence
therefore submits that the Trial Chamber committed an
error in fact, not an error in law.99
Based on Strugar and Blagojevič and Jokič, it is not easy to
differentiate between a “pure” error of fact and a “mixed” error of law
and fact. In both of these cases, the court applied the correct legal
standard. In both cases, the appellants argued that the trial chamber’s
findings were not based upon sufficient evidence, and yet the appeals
chambers characterized the issue differently. In the end perhaps it
doesn’t much matter, because the standard of review is the same—
deference.
V. THE DECISIONS

IN THE

GOTOVINA

AND

PERIŠIĆ CASES

A. Gotovina
1. Background and Charges
Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on June 25,
1991.100 By the end of that year, the Yugoslav People’s Army
(“JNA”)101 and “various Serb forces” occupied about one-third of Croatia.102 This occupation was concentrated in the Krajina region between
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.103 In December of 1991, the occupied
ber’s factual findings in terms of its assessment of evidence, it
will either analyse these allegations to determine the reasonableness of the impugned conclusions or refer to the relevant analysis
under other grounds of appeal.
98
Prosecutor v. Blagojevič & Jokič, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 144 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007).
99
Id. ¶ 145.
100
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak, & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶
2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011).
101
Id. ¶¶ 2, 7.
102
Id. ¶ 2.
103
Historically, the Krajina was the military border between Croatia and Bosnia
Herzegovina. NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY 77 (1994). Ethnic Serbs
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territory was declared the Republic of the Serbian Krajina (“RSK”) and
it established its own government.104 From then until 1995, Croatia
engaged in a series of military operations with the goal of retaking the
Krajina.105 The culmination of this effort was Operation Storm, which
began on August 2, 1995 and ended on August 5, 1995 with a Croatian
declaration of victory.106
According to the best estimate, in the wake of Operation
Storm, 180,000 Croatian Serbs fled Croatia, going mostly to BosniaHerzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”).107 Elisabeth Rhen, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human
Rights, testified: “In the three years before the military operations of
1995, the proportion of Serbs in the Krajina had significantly increased,”108 while after Operation Storm, “only 3,500 Serbs remain[ed]
in the former Sector North and 2,000 Serbs remain[ed] in the former
Sector South, representing a small percentage of the former Krajina
Serb population.”109
Ante Gotovina was the commander of the Split Military District (“MD”) of the Croatian Army (“HV”)110 and overall operational
commander of Operation Storm in the southern Krajina region.111 He
was charged, along with Ivan Černak, the commander of the Knin
Garrison,112 and Mladen Markač, the Assistant Minister of the Interior,113 with being a member of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”)
whose purpose was to bring about the “permanent removal of the Serb
population from the Krajina region by force, fear or threat of force,
persecution, forced displacement, transfer and deportation, appropria-

had lived there peacefully with their non-Serb neighbors since World War II.
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 129 (1997).
104
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak, & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶
2.
105
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak, & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Amended
Joinder Indictment ¶ 25–27 (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/gotovina/ind/en/got-amdjoind070517e.pdf.
106
Id. ¶ 27.
107
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak, & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶
1712.
108
Id. ¶¶ 1711-12.
109
Id. ¶ 1712.
110
Id. ¶ 7.
111
Id. ¶ 4.
112
Id. ¶ 5.
113
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak, & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶
6. By virtue of his position, Markač was also the commander of the Special Police,
who also participated in Operation Storm.
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tion and destruction of property or other means.”114 The membership
of the JCE also included some of the highest-ranking officials in the
115
–
Croatian government, including its then president, Franjo Tudman.
According to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber found that
Gotovina had significantly contributed to, and shared the objective of,
the JCE by virtue of “ordering unlawful attacks against civilians and
civilian objects in Knin, Benkovac, and Obrovac and by failing to make
a serious effort to prevent or investigate crimes committed against
Serb civilians in the Split MD.”116
Membership in a JCE is not itself a crime.117 It is a way of
attributing liability to those who do not directly participate in the commission of a substantive offense.118 In this sense, it performs some of
the same functions as conspiracy in U.S. law.119 There are three forms
of JCE, only two of which (JCE I and JCE III) are relevant to this
analysis.120 JCE I imputes liability for substantive crimes based on
the shared intent of the JCE members to achieve its common purpose.121 JCE III makes the members of a JCE liable for crimes outside
its common purpose (deviant crimes) if those crimes are “‘a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the implementation of the common
114

Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak, & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Amended
Joinder Indictment ¶¶ 10, 12 (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/gotovina/ind/en/got-amdjoind070517e.pdf.
115
–
Id. ¶ 15. Tudman
was deceased at the time of the indictment. The alleged other
members of the JCE, all of whom were deceased at the time of trial, were Gojko
Šušak, the Minister of Defense, Janko Bobetka, the Chief of the Main Staff of the
HV, and Zvonimir Červenko, who succeeded Bobetka. Id.
116
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 3 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012.
117
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of International
Criminal Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 118 (2005). Although there is substantial case
law and academic debate about JCE, a brief overview of the doctrine is all that is
necessary here. For a more thorough analysis, see Mark A. Summers, The Problem
of Risk in International Criminal Law, WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 2014).
118
Prosecutor v. Tadič, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 226-28 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
119
Danner & Martinez, supra note 117, at 140–41.
120
Prosecutor v. Tadič, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 226-28; Gunel Guliyeva, The Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise and ICC Jurisdiction, 5 EYES ON
THE ICC 49, 53 (2008), available at http://www.americanstudents.us/Pages%20
from%20Guliyeva.pdf (noting that JCE II involves the liability for crimes committed within the framework of an “ ‘organized criminal system’ such as concentration
or detention camps”).
121
Guliyeva, supra note 120, at 52–53.
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purpose.”122 Via JCE I, the Trial Chamber convicted Gotovina of the
crimes which were within the common purpose of the JCE.123 He was
also found guilty of deviant crimes under JCE III.124
2. The 200-Meter Standard
The Appeals Chamber made it crystal clear that the ultimate
validity of the Trial Chamber Judgment rested on its conclusion that
Gotovina had ordered “unlawful” artillery attacks against civilian
targets during Operation Storm.125 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber
found that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the attacks were unlawful was ineluctably linked to its “impact analysis” of the artillery
strikes, which, in turn, was predicated on its finding that “with no exceptions . . . impact sites within 200 metres of such targets were evidence of a lawful attack, and impact sites beyond 200 metres from
such targets were evidence of an indiscriminate attack.”126 Indeed, the
Trial Chamber’s reliance on the 200-Meter Standard was so pivotal
that other evidence suggesting that there had been indiscriminate
shelling of civilian objects “was indicative of an unlawful attack only in
the context of the Trial Chamber’s application of the 200-Meter Standard.”127 Thus, as it was portrayed by the Majority, the 200-Meter
–
Id. at 53 (citing Prosecutor v. Brdanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 258
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sep. 1, 2004)).
123
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak, & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶
2619 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011) (Crimes against
humanity – Persecution (Count 1), Deportation (Count 2), and War crimes (wanton destruction)).
124
Id. (Crimes against humanity, murder, inhumane acts (Counts 6 and 8, respectively); War Crimes, wanton destruction, murder, and cruel treatment (Counts 5, 7
and 9, respectively)).
125
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶
24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012) (stating that unlawful attacks were the “touchstone” of the Trial Chamber’s analysis concerning the
existence of a JCE); id. ¶ 77 (observing that unlawful attacks were the “core indicator that the crime of deportation had taken place”); id. ¶ 92 (finding that unlawful attacks were “the primary means by which the forced departure of Serb
civilians from the Krajina region was effected); id. ¶ 96 (concluding that the unlawful attacks “constituted the core basis for finding that Serb civilians were forcibly displaced”).
126
Id. ¶ 64. See also id. ¶ 25 (“Using the 200 Metre Standard as a yardstick, the
Trial Chamber found that all impact sites located more than 200 metres from a
target it deemed legitimate served as evidence of an unlawful artillery attack.”);
id. ¶ 51 (“The Trial Chamber heavily relied on the 200 Metre Standard to underpin its Impact Analysis.”); and id. at ¶ 57 (“The Trial Chamber’s Impact Analysis
never deviated from the 200 Metre Standard.”).
127
Id. ¶ 65. See also id. ¶ 82 (“[T]he Trial Chamber assessed much of the other
evidence on the record to be ambiguous and considered it indicative of unlawful
122
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Standard was the lynchpin of the Trial Chamber’s Judgment, so that if
the 200-Meter Standard fell, then surely, so would Gotovina’s
conviction.
Yet, despite the fact that all five of the Appeals Chamber
judges agreed that the Trial Chamber erred in adopting the 200-Meter
Standard,128 only three concluded that Gotovina’s conviction should be
reversed.129 The Majority found that the Trial Chamber’s mistake regarding the 200-Meter Standard was due to the lack of evidence in the
record to support it and because the Trial Chamber failed adequately
to explain its reasoning, i.e., failed to provide a reasoned opinion.130
Based on this, the Appeals Chamber undertook de novo review of the
Trial Chamber judgment.131 In so doing, it swept aside not only the
Trial Chamber’s findings based on the 200-Meter Standard, but also
all the other evidence of Gotovina’s guilt.132
3. Error of Fact, Error of Law or Something Else?
While the Appeals Chamber was quite clear that the Trial
Chamber’s error regarding the 200-Meter Standard was the fatal flaw
in its judgment, it was much less clear regarding the nature of this
error. At first it appeared that the Appeals Chamber regarded it as an
error of fact when it said that when a Trial Chamber’s approach leads
to an “unreasonable assessment of the facts,” an appeals chamber
must consider “carefully whether the Trial Chamber did not commit
an error of fact in its choice of the method of assessment or in its application thereof.”133 This seemed to perfectly describe the situation in
artillery attacks only when viewed through the prism of the Impact Analysis.”);
and id. ¶ 83 (“The Trial Chamber’s reliance on the Impact Analysis was so significant that even considered in its totality, the remaining evidence does not definitively demonstrate that artillery attacks against the Four Towns were unlawful.”).
128
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Separate Opinion of
Judge Theodor Meron, ¶ 2. (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
2012).
129
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 158.
Judges Meron, Robinson, and Güney concurred in the decision; Judges Agius and
Pocar dissented.
130
Id. ¶ 61.
131
Id. ¶ 64.
132
See Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, ¶ 13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
16, 2012) (criticizing that the Majority’s reliance on the Trial Chamber’s error regarding the 200-meter standard because it then proceeded to “discard all evidence
on the record with respect to the impact sites”).
133
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 50 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzidana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 119
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda June 1, 2001)). The Kayishema and Ruzidana Ap-
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Gotovina; i.e., the trial court erred both in its choice of the 200-Meter
Standard as its “method of assessment,” and it also erred in its application of that standard to the facts.134 After identifying a factual error,
the Appeals Chamber should have applied the “no reasonable trier of
fact” standard of review to determine whether any reasonable trial
chamber could have reached the same result135 and, if not, whether
the mistake caused a miscarriage of justice.136

peals Chamber stated that if the Trial Chamber’s “approach in assessment of evidence . . . is reasonable, the [Appeals] Chamber is bound to respect it”; Prosecutor
v. Kayishema & Ruzidana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment,¶ 121. The Gotovina
Appeals Chamber also cited Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A,
Judgment, ¶ 63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000). In
Aleksovski, the Trial Chamber found that witnesses had suffered without requiring any medical or scientific evidence to substantiate their testimony. The Appeals
Chamber observed that it “has to give a margin of deference to the Trial Chamber’s evaluation of the evidence presented at trial” and that it may overturn that
determination “only where the evidence could not have been accepted by any reasonable tribunal or where the evaluation of the evidence is wholly erroneous.”
134
Though he called it an error of law, dissenting Judge Pocar described the Trial
Chamber’s use of the 200-meter standard as an assessment tool:
Thus, in its assessment of the evidence, the Trial Chamber used
the 200 Metre Standard as a presumption of legality–which was
generous and to the benefit of Gotovina–to analyse in part the
evidence of the shelling attacks and the artillery impacts. In my
view, there is therefore no doubt that, while the error was allegedly founded on a factual basis, the establishment of the 200 Metre Standard and its use ultimately constitutes an error of law.
The 200 Metre Standard was, as its name indicates, a standard
or a legal tool that the Trial Chamber used in order to determine
that Rajčič was not credible when he claimed that Gotovina’s attack order was understood as directing his subordinates only to
target designated military objectives.
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Fausto Pocar, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
2011). In fact, as I will argue, the best classification is a mixed error of law and
fact as to which deference to the trial court’s findings is the appropriate standard
of review. See infra Part VI.
135
See Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, ¶ 19 (reasoning that there was other evidence, apart
from the 200-meter standard upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied to find that the artillery attacks were unlawful).
136
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-/7/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 37 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000) (“In putting forward this question
[of fact] as a ground of appeal, the Appellant must discharge two burdens. He must
show that the Trial Chamber did indeed commit the error, and, if it did, he must
go on to show that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”). (quoting Ser-
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Thereafter, the Appeals Chamber proceeded to analyze the evidence that the Trial Chamber heard regarding the 200-Meter Standard,137 concluding that “[t]he Trial Judgment contains no indication
that any evidence considered by the Trial Chamber suggested a 200
metre margin of error.”138 It also rejected the prosecution’s argument
that the 200-Meter Standard was “a maximum possible range of error,” not because this was not a reasonable interpretation of the evidence, but rather because “the Trial Chamber did not justify the 200
Metre Standard on this basis.”139 Even if that were so, given the Appeals Chamber’s approach to errors of fact discussed above, it should
not have summarily dismissed the prosecution’s argument, since a
Trial Chamber’s findings should stand if they are reasonable.140
Instead, and although the Appeals Chamber had stated that
there was “no indication of any evidence” supporting the 200-Meter
Standard, the Appeals Chamber then described the problem as a failure by the Trial Chamber to “explain the specific basis on which it
arrived at a 200 metre margin of error as a reasonable interpretation
of the evidence on the record.”141 In the next paragraph, the Majority
observed that “absent any specific reasoning as to the derivation of
this margin of error, there is no obvious relationship between the evidence received and the 200 Metre Standard.”142 The Majority thus
changed course from its original approach to the issue as one of factual
error, making it explicit that there were in two errors in the Trial
Chamber’s judgment:
[T]he Trial Chamber adopted a margin of error that was
not linked to any evidence it received; this constituted an
error on the part of the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber also provided no explanation as to the basis for the
margin of error it adopted; this amounted to a failure to
provide a reasoned opinion, another error.143
Was the real issue that the 200-Meter Standard was not supported by
the evidence, or that the Trial Chamber failed to explain why? And, if
there really was no evidence that any reasonable trier of fact could
have relied upon, how could such an explanation have been possible?
suhago v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 98-39-A, Reasons for Judgment, ¶ 22 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Apr. 6, 2000)).
137
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment ¶¶ 52–57
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012).
138
Id. ¶ 58.
139
Id. ¶ 59.
140
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
141
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 58.
142
Id. ¶ 59.
143
Id. ¶ 61.

670 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:4

Notwithstanding these ambiguities,144 the Majority confidently concluded that, given the error of law in failing to provide a reasoned
opinion, it would “consider de novo the remaining evidence on the record to determine whether the conclusions of the Impact Analysis are
still valid.”145
4. De Novo Review
Gotovina appears to be the first case in which an ICTY Appeals
Chamber has held that a de novo review of the record is appropriate
when the legal error was a failure to provide a reasoned opinion.146
Indeed, the ICTY cases are replete with assertions that an appeals
chamber will not conduct a trial de novo.147 One appeals chamber went
so far as to say that “[t]he Appeals Chamber would act ultra vires
when reviewing proprio motu the entire trial record.”148 When it identifies an error of law because the Trial Chamber applied an incorrect
legal standard:
The Appeals Chamber . . . will in principle only take into
account evidence referred to by the Trial Chamber in the
body of the judgment or in a related footnote, evidence
contained in the trial record and referred to by the parties, and, where applicable, additional evidence admitted
on appeal.149
Some cases refer to this standard of review as de novo review, though
it is clearly a less extensive review than trial de novo as it is limited to
144

See Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
16, 2012) (observing that the Majority should have “clearly explained” why the
Trial Chamber’s error in “adopting a margin of error that was not linked to any
evidence in the record” constituted the application of an incorrect legal standard
(which would then permit it to proceed with a de novo review)).
145
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 64.
146
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Carmel Agius, ¶ 9. As Judge Agius observed, the failure to provide a reasoned opinion is “clearly not an error of law arising from the application of an
incorrect legal standard.”
147
See supra note 90.
148
Prosecutor v. Kordič & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 21 n.15
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).
149
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Miloševič, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 14
(Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009). Based on my research,
Gotovina is the first ICTY case to omit the language cited in the text from the
“Standard of Review” section of its opinion. Perišić, decided a few months later,
was the other. Interestingly, the case decided in between those two cases contained the language. See Prosecutor v. Lukič & Lukič, Case No. IT-98-321/1-A,
Judgment, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 4, 2012).
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the evidence in the trial chamber judgment and in the record, only if
the parties bring the latter to the appeals chamber’s attention.150
Nonetheless, an error in failing to provide a reasoned opinion does not
justify even this more restricted form of de novo review.
The ICTR case cited by the majority provides, at best, ambiguous support for its holding that de novo review of the record is appropriate when there is a failure to provide a reasoned opinion.151
Kalimanzira involved the reliability of identifications made by two different witnesses. Regarding the first witness, BWK, the Appeals
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had not “explicitly explained
why it had accepted BWK’s identification evidence” and that its failure
to do so was an error of law.152 It then “consider[ed] the relevant evidence,” concluding that BWK’s uncorroborated identification was “unsafe.”153 Ultimately, however, the Appeals Chamber did not reverse
the appellant’s conviction on this ground because the Trial Chamber’s
error “did not result in a miscarriage of justice.”154 Thus, despite its
statement that the error was one of law, and because the miscarriage
of justice standard applies only to errors of fact,155 it is apparent that
the Kalimanzira Appeals Chamber treated the failure to provide a reasoned opinion as a factual problem.
The Kalimanzira Appeals Chamber reached a similar conclusion with regard to the second identification witness, BDK, but, for
reasons that are not apparent, applied a different standard of review
when it concluded that it was not “convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt” by the identification evidence and, therefore, that appellant’s
conviction was “unsafe.”156 While this more closely resembles the standard of review for errors of law,157 it is important to note that there is
heightened scrutiny of the obligation to provide a reasoned opinion in
uncorroborated identification cases.158 Moreover, the review undertaken in Kalimanzira must also be assessed in light of the oft-repeated
position of the ICTY Appeals Chamber—that it will not engage in de
novo review.159 Thus, the case cited by the majority does not support
150

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, ¶¶ 10-14.
151
Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 99-100, 199200 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 20, 2010).
152
Id. ¶ 99.
153
Id. ¶ 100.
154
Id. ¶ 126.
155
See supra text accompanying note 76.
156
Id. ¶ 201.
157
See supra text accompanying note 80.
158
See supra text accompanying note 69.
159
See supra note 90.

672 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:4

its sweeping application of de novo review when the error of law is the
failure to provide a reasoned opinion.
Moreover, if the failure to provide a reasoned opinion is an error of law, why did the majority neglect to use the standard of review
applicable to such errors? As dissenting Judge Agius pointed out earlier in its judgment, the Gotovina majority parroted the correct standard of review when a Trial Chamber applies an incorrect legal
standard:160
[T]he Appeals Chamber will articulate the correct legal
standard and review the relevant findings of the trial
chamber accordingly. In so doing, the Appeals Chamber
not only corrects the legal error, but, when necessary,
also applies the correct legal standard to the evidence
contained in the trial record and determines whether it
is itself convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
factual finding challenged by the appellant before that
finding is confirmed on appeal.161
Several observations are apparent. First, the majority never
even attempted to articulate a correct legal standard.162 Second, it is
impossible to articulate a correct legal standard when dealing with an
insufficiently reasoned opinion grounded on a factual error because
the error is essentially one of fact, not law.163 Finally, the majority’s
purported de novo review was a thinly disguised ruse for substituting
its judgment for that of the Trial Chamber without following its own
rules. By its own standards, the majority had only two choices: 1) substitute its findings of fact for those of a trial chamber only if no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion and the result
would be a miscarriage of justice;164 or 2) identify an error of law, articulate the correct standard, and apply the correct standard to the
facts in order to ascertain whether guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.165 A third option—identify an error of fact, characterize
it as an error of law, and conduct a de novo review, substituting the

160

Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Carmel Agius, ¶8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
2012).
161
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 12 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012).
162
See Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Carmel Agius, ¶ 14.
163
See id. ¶ 9.
164
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 13.
165
Id. ¶ 12.
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Appeals Chamber’s findings for those of the Trial Chamber—simply
does not exist in the current jurisprudence of the Tribunal.166
5. The House of Cards Collapses
With the 200-Meter Standard out of the way and along with it
the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding the unlawfulness of the attacks, the majority made swift work of the other arguments for affirming the conviction. It waved aside evidence that showed that the
attacks were indiscriminate because some of the shells landed so far
from any legitimate target that they could not be justified by any margin of error.167 Likewise, it belittled other evidence of the unlawfulness
of the attacks—including statements made by Gotovina during a meet–
ing with Tudman
and others to plan Operation Storm (the Brioni
Meeting) and Gotovina’s order to attack the towns without specifying
targets—because the evidence was ambiguous or somehow tainted by
the original sin of the 200-Meter Standard.168
It found that, without the unlawful artillery attacks, it could
not “affirm the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the only reasonable
interpretation of the circumstantial evidence on the record was that a
JCE, aiming to permanently remove the Serb civilian population from
the Krajina by force or threat of force, existed.”169 The Appeals Chamber also rejected arguments that the artillery attacks that Gotovina
had ordered proved that he had aided and abetted the deportation of
the Serbs who fled the Krajina in their wake.170 The majority’s rejection of the aiding and abetting theory was principally grounded on its
observation that the Trial Chamber “would not characterise civilian
departures from towns and villages subject to lawful artillery attacks
as deportation, nor could it find that those involved in launching lawful artillery attacks had the intent to forcibly displace civilians.”171
166
Judge Agius characterized the Majority’s approach as one which “fail[ed] to
comport with any recognisable standard of review.” Prosecutor v. Gotovina &
Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Agius, ¶ 14.
167
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶ 66.
168
See id. ¶¶ 72–83.
169
Id. ¶ 91.
170
Id. ¶ 115.
171
Id. ¶ 114. This statement by the Majority was disingenuous for two reasons.
First, the Trial Chamber was referring to the shelling of locations other than the
Four Towns which were the focus of the trial. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak
& Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1754-55 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovi
na/tjug/en/110415_judgement_vol2.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač,
Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto Pocar, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2011) (pointing out that “paragraph 1755
of the Trial Judgment to which the Majority refers to support this claim is not
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Finally, the majority dismissed the Trial Chamber’s conclusion
that Gotovina had made a substantial contribution to the JCE by failing to make a “‘serious effort’ to ensure that reports of crimes against
Serb civilians in the Krajina were followed up and future crimes were
prevented.”172 Without identifying any legal standard misapplied to
the facts by the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber reached the conclusion that evidence of the measures taken by Gotovina, coupled with
the Trial Chamber’s failure to address the testimony of a defense witness,173 created a “reasonable doubt” as to Gotovina’s guilt under this
theory.174
B. Perišić
Momčilo Perišic was the Chief of the Yugoslav Army (“VJ”)
General Staff from August 1993 until November 1995.175 As such, he
was the VJ’s highest-ranking officer.176 He was charged with various
crimes177 that had occurred in Sarajevo and Srebrenica based on his
role “in facilitating the provision of military and logistical assistance
from the VJ to the Army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”).”178 The
prosecution alleged that he was responsible for these crimes under two
different theories—aiding and abetting and superior responsibility.179
1. Aiding and Abetting
As to the former, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial
Chamber applied an incorrect legal standard for aiding and abetting.
linked to the Trial Chamber’s findings on the departure of persons from the Four
Towns on 4 and 5 August 1995 but rather concerns the departure of persons from
other locations”). Second, the Trial Chamber did not conclude that the attacks on
those other towns were “lawful.” Rather, it found that “an unlawful attack on civilians or civilian objects in these towns was not the only reasonable interpretation of
the evidence.” Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Čermak & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-T,
Judgment, ¶ 1755.
172
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶118.
173
The witness, Anthony R. Jones, a retired U.S. Lieutenant General, “opined
that Gotovina’s actions were appropriate and sufficient.” Id. ¶ 121.
174
Id. ¶ 134.
175
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/peri
sic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf.
176
Id.
177
The crimes included “murder, extermination, inhumane acts, attacks on civilians, and persecution as crimes against humanity and/or violations of the laws or
customs of war.” Id. ¶ 3.
178
Id.
179
Id.; U.N. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, arts. 7(1), 7(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
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Specifically, it found that the Trial Chamber had erred as a matter of
law by “holding that specific direction is not an element of the actus
reus of aiding and abetting.”180 And, while this error was “understandable” because of the confusing language in some of the Tribunal’s
cases, “the Appeals Chamber’s duty to correct legal errors remain[ed]
unchanged.”181 Applying the correct legal standard, it then reviewed
and assessed “de novo relevant evidence, taking into account, where
appropriate, the Trial Chamber’s findings.”182 The result of this review and assessment was the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion that the
evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Perišić’s
acts were specifically directed at aiding and abetting crimes committed
by the VRS.183 The first part of the Perišić Appeals Chamber judgment
was thus a straightforward application of the standard of review for
errors of law.
2. Superior Responsibility
The Appeals Chamber then turned to the second theory of individual responsibility—superior responsibility. There are three necessary elements for a conviction based on the theory of superior
responsibility: “(i) the existence of superior-subordinate relationship;
(ii) the superior’s failure to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts of his subordinates or punish them
for those actions; (iii) . . . the superior knew or had reason to know that
a criminal act was about to be committed or had been committed.”184
The superior-subordinate relationship is established by proof that the
superior had “the actual ability to exercise sufficient control over the
subordinates so as to prevent them from committing crimes.”185 Appellant challenged the Trial Chamber’s finding that Perišić exercised effective control over both the soldiers in the SVK and those in the VJ,
who had been seconded to the SVK.186 The Appeals Chamber determined that the Trial Chamber had insufficiently analyzed the evidence, which “can amount to a failure to provide a reasoned opinion . . .
[and which] constitutes an error of law requiring de novo review of
evidence by the Appeals Chamber.”187
180

Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment,¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 43.
182
Id. ¶ 45.
183
Id. ¶ 73.
184
Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J.
INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 159, 161 (2007).
185
Id. at 162.
186
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 80-82.
187
Id. ¶ 92. It is interesting that Judge Agius, who so vociferously criticized the
Majority’s use of de novo review in Gotovina, joined in the Perišić judgment, even
though the Perišić Appeals Chamber followed the same approach.
181
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3. De Novo Review
As it did in Gotovina, the Appeals Chamber cited Kalimanzira
as support for its conclusion that de novo review was warranted. Additionally, it cited three other ICTR cases and one ICTY case but, curiously, it did not cite Gotovina. The three other ICTR cases cited by the
Perišić Appeals Chamber do not strengthen the case for de novo review. Instead, they strongly suggest that the appropriate standard of
review should be similar to that for errors of fact.
In Zigiranyirazo,188 the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial
Chamber failed to consider clearly relevant evidence suggesting that
the defendant could not have been in two locations within the
timeframe argued for by the prosecution.189 Although the Trial Chamber erred in failing to provide a reasoned opinion and the Appeals
Chamber categorized it as a error of law, it did not purport to conduct
de novo review on that basis, nor did it identify the correct applicable
legal standard, as it had done a few paragraphs earlier when it found
that the Trial Chamber had reversed the burden of proof applicable to
an alibi defense.190 Instead, it accepted appellant’s estimate of the
travel time as “reasonable” based on the evidence on the record that
the Trial Chamber had failed to consider.191
In Muvunyi,192 the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial
Chamber erred in failing to explain why it relied on the testimony of
witnesses YAI and CCP to convict appellant, even though their evidence was contradicted by the testimony of another witness.193 In
reaching its conclusion that there had been a failure to provide a reasoned opinion, the Appeals Chamber observed that it could not “conclude whether a reasonable trier of fact could have relied on the
testimony of witnesses YAI and CCP to convict Muvunyi for this
event.”194 This strongly suggests that the appropriate standard of review when there is a failure to provide a reasoned opinion based on a
factual error is the same as that applicable to errors of fact. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Muvunyi Appeals Chamber did
not substitute its own factual findings for those of the Trial Chamber.
188
Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-73-A, Judgment, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 16, 2009).
189
Id. ¶¶ 44-46.
190
Id. ¶ 43.
191
Id. ¶ 44. The Appeals Chamber noted that at the hearing the prosecution had
essentially conceded the point. Id. ¶ 44 n.118.
192
Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55 A-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Aug. 29, 2008).
193
Id. ¶ 147.
194
Id.
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Rather, it took the exceptional step of remanding the case for a retrial
on this issue.195
In the Simba judgment,196 also cited by the Perišić Appeals
Chamber, the issue was essentially the same as in Munvunyi—the
failure to provide a reasoned opinion explaining why the Trial Chamber had credited the testimony of a witness regarding the time the defendant arrived at a particular location.197 Rather than stating that it
intended to conduct a de novo review, the Simba Appeals Chamber
said that it would “consider . . . whether and, if necessary, to what
extent the Trial Chamber’s error affects its findings relating to the Appellant’s participation in the attacks at the Murambi Technical School
and Kaduha Parish on 21 April 1994 within the time frame emerging
from the relevant testimonies.”198 After reviewing the evidence, the
Appeals Chamber concluded that “a reasonable trier of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt” that appellant had been in the two
locations on the relevant date, thus applying the standard of review
applicable to errors of fact.199
The final cited case, the ICTY’s appeals judgment in Limaj,200
likewise seems to weaken the support for de novo review and
strengthen the case for applying the deference standard when there is
no reasoned opinion based on an error of fact. The Limaj Appeals
Chamber found no error based on the claim that the Trial Chamber
had failed to cite in its judgment relevant evidence claimed to undercut the credibility of two prosecution witnesses because “the Trial
Chamber reasonably accepted the honesty of their testimony.”201
Therefore, “a reasonable trier of fact” could have found the witnesses
credible.202
Limaj well illustrates the point that failing to provide a reasoned opinion does not genuinely convert an error of fact into one of
law that alters the appropriate standard of review. While it did not do
so, the Appeals Chamber could have characterized the Trial Cham195

Id. ¶ 148. Because of the length and complexity of international criminal trials
and the long periods of time defendants spend in jail prior to trial (Muvunyi had
been in jail for eight years), the ad hoc tribunals are reluctant to order retrials. Id.
196
Simba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Judgment. (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda Nov. 27, 2007).
197
Id. ¶ 142.
198
Id. ¶ 143.
199
It should be noted that the failure to provide a reasoned opinion was intertwined with other alleged errors of fact. Id. ¶ 144. But, the Appeals Chamber did
not separate them when it made the statement quoted in the text.
200
Prosecutor v. Limaj, et. al., Case No. IT-03-66-A, Judgment. (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007).
201
Id. ¶ 88.
202
Id.
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ber’s failure to address “clear and identical” discrepancies in the witnesses’ stories203 as the failure to provide a reasoned opinion. But that
does not change the fact that the essential nature of the appellate review is the same in both cases; that is, whether the trial chamber acted
reasonably in reaching its conclusions.
In addition to the fact that its cited precedents do not support
the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s conclusion that de novo review was appropriate, its approach contradicts that taken by another ICTY Appeals Chamber that had faced the identical question. In Strugar,204
the appellant argued that the Trial Chamber erred when it found that
a superior-subordinate relationship existed because he had the ability
to prevent or punish the crimes that were committed and, therefore,
that he had “effective control.”205 The Strugar Appeals Chamber rejected the appellant’s characterization of the issue as an alleged error
of law, finding that “it is more accurately characterized as a mixed
error of law and fact” to which it would apply the “no reasonable trier
of fact” standard of review,206 the same standard applicable to pure
questions of fact.207
Strugar is clearly the better-reasoned case. In neither Strugar
nor Perišić did the Trial Chamber misapprehend the correct legal standard. Instead, in both cases the issue was whether the Trial Chamber
had correctly applied the legal standard to the facts. While merely labeling the issue as a mixed question is not dispositive, a court should
not treat the issue as one of law if the trial court is in a better position
to decide the question and the result would not bring greater clarity to
the law.208 That rationale clearly applies to both Strugar and Perišić.
In neither case did the Appeals Chamber add to, or subtract from, the
interpretation of the effective control necessary to establish the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship. On the other hand, both
did involve ascertaining whether the trial chamber had correctly applied the well-established legal standard to the facts, an issue which
should be decided by giving the trial chamber’s findings due deference
and reversing it only if no reasonable trier of fact could have reached
the same conclusion.

203

Id. ¶ 87.
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008).
205
Id. ¶¶ 247–48, 251.
206
Id. ¶ 252.
207
See Milanovic, supra note 8.
208
See supra note 96.
204

2015]

THE ICTY APPEALS CHAMBER

679

CONCLUSION
The reasoned opinion requirement originating in the civil law
systems sits somewhat uncomfortably next to the deference standard
for the review of a trial chamber’s factual findings imported from the
common law model.209 There is a strong argument, however, that both
are necessary. The reasoned opinion is an essential element of a fair
trial because complex international criminal cases take years to try
and the verdicts are based on voluminous evidence. Without reasoned
opinions, appellate review would simply be impossible. On the other
hand, because the international criminal tribunals largely follow the
common law procedure of presenting the trial evidence in open court,
it is unarguably true that the trial judges are in a better position when
it comes to determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight and
persuasiveness of the evidence. Thus, deference seems to be the appropriate standard of review.
The vexing question is what standard of review is applicable
when there is a failure to provide a reasoned opinion. It is unassailable
that the failure to provide such an opinion is an error of law because
all of the tribunals’ statutes impose that obligation on trial chambers.210 But, it is equally true that this error of law does not stem from
the failure to apply the correct legal standard, which triggers a limited
form of de novo review requiring articulation of the correct legal standard and application of it to the facts of the case. The failure to provide
a reasoned opinion cannot result in this form of review because it is
impossible to articulate a correct legal standard if there has been no
mistake in that regard.
Moreover, de novo review of these errors does not serve the
main purposes of appellate review, which are to insure consistency and
develop the law:
The decision that a certain body of evidence warrants or
does not warrant a certain factual finding beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be of relevance to any other case,
where the quantity and type of evidence, as well as the
demeanor and credibility of witnesses, will necessarily be
different.211
In the Gotovina and Perišić decisions, the Appeals Chambers employed a trompe l’oeil to transform what was essentially an error of fact
into an error of law, which freed them to substitute their findings for
that of the Trial Chambers’. Consequently, these decisions have
“lessen[ed] the ICTY historical record of the conflict in the former Yu209
210
211

See Fleming, supra note 2, at 138.
See supra note 46.
Fleming, supra note 2, at 135.
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goslavia” and “might result in a lack of predictability and confidence in
the tribunal writ large.”212
The most obvious way to correct the deficiencies in the reasoned opinions in these cases would have been to remand the cases to
the trial chambers. Fearing additional delays in cases when defendants may have already been in jail for years and because of the finite
existence of the ad hoc tribunals, appeals chambers have been reluctant to remand.213 Such fears are overblown when the remand is to
correct a reasoned opinion because there would be no need for additional evidence, and the specific areas requiring clarification would be
identified.
Unlike the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC Statute
authorizes its Appeals Chamber to “remand a factual issue to the original Trial Chamber for it to report back accordingly.”214 This method of
curing deficiencies in a reasoned opinion would be rendered nugatory
if the ICC follows the ICTY cases which characterize such errors as
errors of law. Hopefully the ICC Appeals Chamber will see such errors
for what they really are—errors of fact that have been insufficiently
explained in the reasoned opinion—and use the power of remand
rather than making its own findings of fact from its inferior position to
assess the evidence based only on the cold record.
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